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GASPERINI IN LINE WITH ERIE: NEW YORK
LAW DETERMINES EXCESSIVENESS OF
VERDICT IN DIVERSITY CASES
The Erie doctrine, announced in 1938 by the United States
Supreme Court in Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins,l holds
that the state law of the forum state shall be applied to all
substantive issues in cases whose appearance in federal court is
based solely on the parties' diversity of citizenship. 2 The Erie
1. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). On July 27, 1934, Harry J. Tompkins was
walking in a northerly direction along a beaten pathway which ran next to the
Erie Railroad's tracks in Hughestown, Pennsylvania. Tompkins v. Erie R.R.
Co., 90 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1937), rev'd., 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The narrow
pathway ran two feet or closer to the tracks in the unlit area in which
Tompkins was travelling. Id. at 604. At about 2:30 a.m., a whistle and
headlight announced the approach of a freight train from a curve to the north.
Id. As the moving train passed him, Tompkins was struck on the head by an
object protruding from one of the cars. Id. Knocked off balance, Tompkin's
right arm fell under the wheels of the train. Id. Tompkins brought a personal
injury suit against the Erie R.R. Co. in New York since Erie R.R. was a New
York corporation. Erie, 304 U.S. at 69. The Erie R.R. Co. asserted that,
under Pennsylvania law, its duty to Tompkins was merely that which is owed
to a tresspasser - - no liability is imposed absent wanton or willful negligence.
Id. at 70. Tompkins argued, unsuccessfully, that no such rule had been
promulgated by the Pennsylvania legislature or its courts, and thus, federal
common law should control. Id.
2. Erie, 304 U.S. 64. The Court overruled its holding in Swift v. Tyson,
41 U.S. 19 (1842) (holding that a federal court exercising jurisdiction based on
diversity of citizenship does not have to apply the unwritten law of the State's
highest court; rather the federal court is free to exercise independent judgment
in determining the applicable common law of that State). Id. at 72. The Erie
Court, reinterpreting § 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 (28 U.S.C.A. § 1652
(1994)), held that a federal judge sitting in a diversity case may not disregard
the common law decisions of the state courts. Id. at 71. Thus. federal courts
would no longer be empowered to create state law judicially, since state law
was a forum in which Congress was prohibited from acting legislatively. Id. at
72. In holding that there was no "federal general common law," the Court
1
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Court, pursuant to its reading of section 34 of the Judiciary Act
of 1789, the Rules of Decision Act, 3 stated, "[e]xcept in matters
governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress, the
law to be applied in any case is the law of the State." 4 While Erie
served to settle the "choice of law" question of federal civil
procedure, the actual application of the Erie doctrine has proven
to be quite perplexing. From Erie and its progeny, the Court in
Hanna v. Plumer5 fashioned a workable, "outcome-affective"
test with which the Erie Doctrine could be adeptly applied in a
federal diversity case faced with the issue of "whether or not to
apply state law."' 6 The Hanna test, conceding that the state rule
is "indeed relevant,"' 7 simply asked whether application of that
rule would so greatly affect the outcome of the litigation that
"failure to enforce it would unfairly discriminate against citizens
of the forum State, or whether application of the rule would have
so important an effect upon the fortunes of one or both of the
litigants that failure to enforce it would be likely to cause a
plaintiff to choose federal court." ' 8
The Supreme Court recently applied the Erie doctrine in
Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc.9 In Gasperini, a case
ruled that state law, including its common law decisions, is the law to be
applied in a diversity case heard in federal court. Id. at 72-73.
3. Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the Rules of Decision Act,
now contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1994), provides in pertinent part, "[t]he
laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the
United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be
regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States,
in cases where they apply." Id.
4. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
5. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
6. Id. at 468.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. 116 S. Ct. 2211 (1996). In Gasperini, a journalist contracted to lend
300 original color transparencies to the Center for Humanities, Inc. on the
condition that they were returned when the project was completed. Id. at
2215. The Center lost the transparencies and Gasperini sued. Id. at 2216.
After trial, the jury awarded compensatory damages to Gasperini in the amount
of $450,000, since the "industry standard" value for each transparency was
$1,500. Id. The Second Circuit reversed, applying New York Civil Practice
[Vol 13676
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originating in the Southern District of New York, 10 the Court
resolved the Erie conflict of whether to apply the state statute or
the judicially-created federal policy "to measure the alleged
excessiveness of a jury's verdict in an action for damages based
on state law." 11 The Supreme Court held that, in diversity cases,
state law supersedes federal law in establishing the standard by
which the court determines whether a money verdict is
excessive. 12
In addition, pursuant to the restrictions of the Seventh
Amendment, issues of fact determined by a jury may only be re-
examined pursuant to the common law of the forum state.
13
While state law governs substantive issues, federal sources of law
Law and Rules § 5501(c), which instructs that when a jury returns an itemized
verdict, the New York Appellate Division "shall determine that an award is
excessive or inadequate if it deviates materially from what would be reasonable
compensation." Id. at 2216. The Second Circuit vacated the judgment entered
on the jury's verdict and ordered a new trial, unless Gasperini agreed to an
award of $100,000. Id. at 2216-17. Certiorari was granted to resolve tne
question of what standard a federal court should use to determine the
excessiveness of a jury's verdict in an action based on state law. Id. at 2217.
10. Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 66 F.3d 427 (2d Cir. 1995),
vacated, 116 S. Ct. 2211 (1996). The Court of Appeals for 'the Second Circuit,
interpreting New York law, held that while the jury applied the correct
"industry standard" to compute the value of the lost transparencies, the jury
should have discounted the value of some of the transparencies because they
were not equally original and because Gasperini's earnings from his
photography yielded a mere $10,000 from 1984 to 1993. Id. at 429.
11. Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2217.
12. Id. at 2219. The Gasperini Court stated:
[f]ederal diversity jurisdiction provides an alternative forum for the
adjudication of state-created rights, but it does not carry with it
generation of rules of substantive law. As Erie read the Rules of
Decision Act: '[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal Constitution
or by acts of Congess, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the
State.'
Id. at 2219 (emphasis added) (quoting Erie, 304 U.S. at 78).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. The Seventh Amendment provides in
pertinent part: "[i]n suits at common law ... no fact tried by a juty. shall be
otherwise re-exanzined in any Court of the United States, than according to the
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continue to govern procedural issues. 14 Federal courts are not
expected to tailor their procedures to accommodate cases merely
because they are based on the parties' diversity of citizenship. 15
The significance of Gasperini is two-fold. First, it brings the
federal standard for determining the excessiveness of a jury's
damage award in line with the current New York standard. Prior
to 1986, the common law New York standard utilized to
determine whether a money verdict is excessive or inadequate is
whether it "shocked the conscience of the court." 16 In 1986, the
New York state legislature codified a new and less demanding
standard of judicial review for examining the amount of jury
awards. Placed in New York's Civil Practice Law and Rules
Section 5501(c), the revised standard provides in pertinent part:
[i]n reviewing a money judgment in an action in which an
itemized verdict is required by rule forty-one hundred eleven of
this chapter in which it is contended that the award is excessive
or inadequate and that a new trial should have been granted
unless a stipulation is entered to a different award, the appellate
division shall determine that an award is excessive or inadequate
if it deviates materially from what would be reasonable
compensation. 17
As a result of this change to Section 5501(c), the New York
standard was more favorable to defendants than the federal
"shocks the conscience" standard, which thereby encouraged
forum shopping and permitted inequitable administration of the
14. Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2219 (stating that under Erie, "federal courts
sitting in diversity apply state substantive law and federal procedural law").
15. Seeid.
16. Id. at 2217. "More rigorous comparative evaluations attend application
of § 550 1(c)'s 'deviates materially' standard." Id. at 2220. See Consorti v.
Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 64 F.3d 781, superceded by 72 F.3d 1003,
1012 (2d Cir. 1995) (discussing the ambiguity of the traditional "shocks the
conscience" test). See also Matthews v. CTI Container Transport Int'l Inc.,
871 F.2d 270, 278 (2d Cir. 1989); Neal v. Rainbow House Fruits, 87 A.D.2d
511, 447 N.Y.S.2d 487, 488 (1982); Jiuditta v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 75
A.D.2d 126, 428 N.Y.S.2d 535, 543 (1980); Petosa v. City of New York,
Dep't of Sanitation, 63 A.D.2d 1016, 406 N.Y.S.2d 354, 355 (1978).
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law. 18 Gasperini served to end the inequity between state and
federal awards. Further, by requiring federal courts to apply the
New York standard, it helped secure the aims of Erie.
Second, Gasperini endeavored to resolve another traditional
Erie dilemma: determining whether the issue is substantive or
procedural when it really seems to fall in between. As the Court
stated, "[c]lassification of law as 'substantive' or 'procedural' for
Erie purposes is sometimes a challenging endeavor." 19 To
determine whether the issue was one or the other, the Court in
Guaranty Trust Company v. York20 set forth an "outcome-
determination" test: the outcome of an action in federal court.
based on diversity of citizenship, "should be substantially the
same, so far as legal rules determine the outcome of a litigation,
as it would be if tried in a State court." 2 1
Thus, the crucial issue in Gasperini arose: was application of
Section 5501(c) of New York's Civil Practice Law and Rules22
procedural, "in that [Section] 5501(c) assigns decision making
authority to New York's Appellate Division," 23 or was it
substantive, since the "deviates materially" standard essentially
seeks to cap damages by controlling "how much a plaintiff can be
awarded." 24
The Court found that the crux of the Gasperini issue,
specifically, the application of the New York standard for
determining excessiveness of a verdict.2 was tantamount to
applying a principle of substantive law because resolving the
question of whether a jury's award is excessive would have a
significant effect on the outcome of the litigation. The Court
stated that "[p]arallel application of [Section] 5501(c) at the
federal appellate level would be out of sync with the federal
system's division of trial and appellate court functions, an
18. See Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2221.
19. Id. at 2217.
20. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
21. Id. at 109.
22. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 5501(c) (McKinney 1995).
23. Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2219.
24. Id.
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allocation weighted by the Seventh Amendment."' 26 Thus, the
Erie doctrine would be violated if a federal cdurt sitting in a
diversity case was allowed to disregard the New York standard
because a greater judgment would result than a New York state
court would permit. 27
Moreover, upon finding that New York's Civil Practice Law
and Rules Section 5501(c), while facially containing a procedural
instruction, is, in essence, a substantive state goal, 2 8 the Court
held that the "deviates materially" standard can be given effect
without violating the Seventh Amendment's re-examination
clause29 if (1) that statutory standard is applied by the federal
trial court judge and (2) the appellate courts' review of the trial
court ruling is limited to review based on "abuse-of-
discretion." 30 In reaching its decision, the Court
address[ed] the question of whether New York's 'deviates
materially' standard, codified in [Civil Practice Law and Rules
Section] 5510(c), is outcome-affective in this sense: [w]ould
'application of the [standard] ... have so important an effect
upon the fortunes of one or both of the litigants that failure to
[apply] it would [unfairly discriminate against citizens of the
forum State, or] be likely to cause a plaintiff to choose the
federal court?' 3 1
The Court concluded that "U]ust as the Erie principle precludes
a federal court from giving a state-created claim 'longer
life . . . than [the claim] would have had in the state court,' [it
also] precludes a recovery in federal court significantly larger
than the recovery that would have been tolerated in state
court."' 32 Moreover, the Court views New York's "deviates
materially" standard as implicating what the Court considers are
26. Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2219.
27. See id.
28. Id.
29. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
30. 116 S. Ct. at 2224.
31. Id. at 2220 (quoting Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965)).
32. Id. at 2221 (quoting Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co.,
337 U.S. 530, 533-34 (1949)).
680 [Vol 13
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Erie's "twin aims:" 33 "'discouragement of forum shopping and
avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws.'" 34 Thus, the
Court in Gasperini upheld New York's "deviates materially"
standard as the standard with which to test the excessiveness of
the jury's verdict. 3
5
In his dissent, Justice Stevens declared that, while the federal
court should apply the New York standard, 36 since the court of
appeals corrected the error of the district court, 37 he "would not
require the District Court to repeat a task that has already been
performed by the reviewing court." 38 Moreover, he argued that
Gasperini did not implicate the Seventh Amendment because such
appellate review is permissible since mixed questions of law and
fact "require courts to construe all record inferences in favor of
the factfinder's decision" and then determine, based upon the
facts below, whether "the legal standard has been met. " 39 He
further asserts that even if the re-examination clause was
implicated, such appellate review was consonant with the Seventh
Amendment because the review of the Court of Appeals was
"according to the rules of common law." 40
Until Gasperini, the only other Erie-line case to threaten to
tread upon Seventh Amendment ground was Byrd v. Blue Ridge
Rural Electrical Cooperative, Inc.,4 1 a distinguished Court
33. Id. at 2221.
34. 116 S. Ct. at 2220 (quoting Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468).
35. 116 S. Ct. at 2225.
36. Id. at 2225-26 (5-4 decision) (Stevens, J., dissenting). See Leading
Cases, 110 HARV. L. REv. 135, 260 (1996).
37. Id. at 2226. Justice Stevens notes that the Court of Appeals corrected
the District Courts error after "drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of"
the petitioner, the Center for Humanities, Inc. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 2227.
40. Id.
41. 356 U.S. 525 (1958). The Blue Ridge Rural Electrical Coop. provided
electric power to rural areas of South Carolina. Id. at 526. R.H. Bouligney.
Inc., pursuant to a $334,300 contract, was extending Blue Ridge's power lines
by 24 miles, upgrading another 88 miles of power lines and building two new
substations and a breaker station. Id. at 526-27. James Earl Byrd, a North
Carolina resident, was employed by R.H. Bouligney, Inc. as a linesman for
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decision on the intractable Erie doctrine. Byrd involved the same
type of Erie conflict: whether to apply the state statute or the
judicially-created federal policy. However, unlike Gasperini's
fray with the Seventh Amendment's re-examination clause, Byrd
invoked the Amendment's first clause regarding preservation of
the right to trial by jury. 42 In that case, Blue Ridge Rural
Electrical Cooperative, Inc., upon being sued for personal
injuries, asserted that its invocation of a state statutory defense
could only be decided upon by a judge rather than a jury. 43 The
Erie Doctrine would support that contention, requiring the
federal court to invoke the state rule rather than the judicially-
created federal policy favoring the jury as the arbiter of factual
issues .44
However, in Byrd, the Court rejected the use of the "outcome
determinative test" in cases where it would interfere with an
essential character of the independent federal court system. 45
Instead, their inquiry involved a balancing of the competing state
and federal interests. 46 Inevitably, the Seventh Amendment
safeguard prevailed over Erie's pressure. In squaring with the
Amendment's robust trial-by-jury clause, the Court held that the
federal policy favoring the use of a jury to decide factual issues,
such as whether Blue Ridge Rural Electrical Cooperative, Inc.
was entitled to immunity from Byrd's damage suit, outweighed
the State's interest in having the question decided by a judge. 47
The Court reasoned that, while outcome was not its sole
consideration, there was no certainty that different results would
power lines at one of the new substations, Byrd suffered severe injuries,
including the loss of both arms. Byrd, 215 F.2d 542, 543 (1954). Byrd brought
suit for damages stemming from Blue Ridge's negligence in supplying
electrical power. Id.
42. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. The Seventh Amendment provides in
pertinent part, "[i]n suits at common law ... the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved .... " Id. (emphasis added).
43. Byrd, 356 U.S. at 527-28. "A State may, of course, distribute the
functions of its judicial machinery as it sees fit." Id. at 536.
44. See id. at 538.
45. Id. at 537.
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be obtained in federal court given the procedural safeguards
available.4 8 Moreover, the Court observed that an essential
characteristic of the independent federal system "is the manner in
which, in civil common-law actions, it distributes trial functions
between judge and jury and, under the influence - if not the
command - of the Seventh Amendment, assigns the decisions of
disputed questions offact to the juiy."49
However, instead of applying Byrd's more recent balancing
test, the Gasperini Court utilized the "outcome-determination"
test set forth in the earlier Guaranty Trust Company.50 This only
served to further confuse this already obscure realm of Erie
jurisprudence, not only since Byrd was the more recent Erie
precedent, but because it involved the most similar Erie-line
conflict to Gasperini.
As in Byrd, the Seventh Amendment in Gasperini did escape
unscathed, but not without subtle maneuvering on the part of the
Gasperini majority. 5 1 To avoid violating the re-examination
clause while upholding the use of the "devidtes materially"
standard to test the jury's verdict, the Gasperini Court merely
circumvented the Amendment's constraints by differentiating
between the functions of federal trial judges and federal appellate
judges. The Court observed that trial judges "have the 'unique
opportunity to consider the evidence in the living courtroom
context,' 52 while appellate judges see only the 'cold paper
record.' ' 53 Moreover, the Court noted that, case after case, it
reaffirmed the federal trial judges "discretion to grant a new trial
if the verdict appears to the judge to be against the weight of the
evidence." 54  That discretion includes reversing verdicts and
48. Id. at 539-40.
49. Id. at 537 (emphasis added).
50. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).
51. Gasperini, 116 S. Ct. at 2225. Justice Ginsburg, writing for the
majority, was joined by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer. Id.
52. Id. (quoting Taylor v. Washington Terminal Co.. 409 F.2d 145. 148
(D.C. Cir. 1969)).
53. Id. (quoting Gasperfid, 66 F.3d at 431).
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ordering a new trial on the basis of excessiveness.55 Hence, this
trial court discretion was found to predate, and thus, preempt the
Seventh Amendment.
In contrast, an appellate judge did not have the same discretion
to review a federal trial court's denial of a motion to set aside a
jury's verdict because that was seen as "a relatively late and less
secure, development." 56 Thus, such appellate review was deemed
incompatible with the Seventh Amendment's re-examination
clause. 57 However, that does not mean that the Court had not
implicitly approved such review in the past. 58 Previously, courts
of appeals have reviewed district court excessiveness
determinations by applying "abuse of discretion" as their
standard. 59 Further, the Gasperini Court found that:
appellate review for abuse of discretion is reconcilable with the
Seventh Amendment as a control necessary and proper to the fair
administration of justice: '[w]e must give the benefit of every
doubt to the judgment of the trial judge; but surely there must be
an upper limit, and whether that has been surpassed is not a
question of fact with respect to which reasonable men may
differ, but a question of law.' 60
Thus, since review based on "abuse of discretion" is
compatible with the Seventh Amendment, the Gasperini Court
expressly approved appellate review of the trial court's denial of
a motion to set aside a jury's verdict as excessive where "abuse
of discretion" is the standard upon which the review is based. 6 1
At its core, Gasperini comports with the Erie doctrine and
squares with the Seventh Amendment. Under the Erie analysis,
which presses for state law application, the "deviates materially"
standard attached because the statute in question had a state
55. Id.
56. Id. at 2223.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. See also Grumenthal v. Long Island R.R. Co., 393 U.S. 156, 157
(1969).
60. Id. (quoting Dagnello v. Long Island R.R. Co., 289 F.2d 797, 806 (2d
Cir. 1961)) (emphasis added).
61. Id. at 2223-24.
684 [Vol 13
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substantive goal - capping damages. Further, the federal trial
court's power to reverse a verdict and order a new trial on the
basis of excessiveness was found to be consonant with the
Seventh Amendment. Moreover, the Gasperini Court explicitly
approved appellate review of a district court's denial of a motion
to set aside a verdict as excessive. 62
Edie C. Grinblat
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